In the world of academe, each new academic year offers the sense of excitement and hope. However, the tragic events of April 16, 2007, at Virginia Tech - often referred to as Higher Education's 9/11 - have fundamentally altered the manner in which we now must prepare for each new year, especially with regard to recognizing and addressing the behaviors of at-risk students.
Following months of interviews, examination of institutional systems, and the analysis of applicable state and federal laws, three panel reports relating to the tragedy were issued:
Report to the President on Issues Raised by the Virginia Tech Tragedy (June 13, 2007)
Presidential Internal Review: Working Group Report on the Interface Between Virginia Tech Counseling Services, Academic Affairs, Judicial Affairs and Legal Systems (August 17, 2007)
Report of the Review Panel to Governor Kaine of the Commonwealth of Virginia (August 30, 2007)
Each investigative panel identified a variety of factors that may have contributed to Seung-Hui Cho's ability to carry out his rampage on April 16. Although colleges and universities across the country have been loathe to second-guess the actions of Virginia Tech leading up to that horrific day, the magnitude of this event initiated a wave of deliberate introspection by institutions to examine their own systems, plans and communication technology in order to determine institutional readiness to manage a similar crisis.
Each of these major reports were prepared independently; however, a number of "lessons learned" were common to all and warrant serious attention by other colleges and universities.
Lesson One: Collaborate and Communicate
An institution's success in dealing with conduct of at-risk students or other campus emergencies is in direct proportion to the ability of constituencies to collaborate and work effectively with one another.
In the report to Governor Kaine (Governor's Panel), a number of key findings were made regarding poor or incomplete communication, including:
Numerous incidents occurred during Cho's junior year that were clear warnings of instability; however, the University did not intervene effectively. No one knew all the information or connected all the dots.
Several University offices, including Judicial Affairs, the Cook Counseling Center, and the Dean of Students, explained failures to communicate with one another or with Cho's parents, by stating they believed that such communications were prohibited by federal laws governing the privacy of health and education records.
The University's Family Assistance Center fell short in helping families following the attack due to lack of leadership and coordination among service providers.
In addition to encouraging training in crisis management, the Report to the President of Virginia Tech includes a number of recommendations to ensure that the University's communications system is comprehensive, secure and responsive:
Ensure a greater understanding of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) within the University.
Enhance the comprehensive assessment of a case to ensure that serious incidents are reported to a central office, and that information which can be shared is, in fact, shared.
Establish a central University contact for information regarding students at risk.
Communicate with outside agencies that have relevance to campus or individual safety, while observing the legal and ethical imperatives regarding information sharing.
Ensure that, in time of emergency, the University is able to contact someone on the student's behalf if they are not able to do so.
Lesson Two: Planning Ahead
Whatever crisis management plan is adopted, it must be responsive to the institution's needs and capabilities. As a public university with a campus population of almost 35,000, Virginia Tech has the resources to employ a fully-accredited police force to monitor a 2,600 acre campus with 131 major buildings. In addition, the University established numerous means to communicate with the campus community, including: (1) a campus-wide broadcast e-mail system; (2) a web site to post emergency warnings; (3) a text messaging system; (4) a broadcast phone mail system; and (5) outdoor loudspeakers to make emergency announcements. Despite the existence of these systems, which either were operational or almost complete on April 16, the Governor's Panel concluded that "[t]he protocol for sending an emergency message ... was cumbersome, untimely and problematic when a decision was needed as soon as possible." Further, "[t]he [Virginia Tech] police did not have the capability to send an emergency alert message on their own."
